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Abstract 
The distribution of secret communication keys in a computer 
network using single-key encryption is discussed. It is shown 
that simple handshakes cannot prevent impersonation. A solution 
based on time-stamps is proposed. 
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Introduct ion 
Secret communication between two users on a computer network 
Is possible using either single-key (conventional) encryption or 
public-key encryption [DIFF7G]. With single-key encryption, the 
communicants share a secret communication key that is used both 
to encipher and dec ipher messages transmi tted between them. Wi th 
public-key encryption, each user has both a public key and secret 
key, and two users can communicate secretly simply by employing 
each other's public keys. (The sender transmits a message enci-
phered under the receiver's public key, which the receiver then 
deciphers using his secret key.) In this note we consider the 
problem of establishing secret communication in a singie-key sys-
tem. 
Key Distribution 
Needham and Schroeder propose protocols for obtaining com-
munication keys from an Authentication Server (AS) [NEED78]. 
They assume that .each user A has a private (secret) key KA which 
is known only to A and AS. If two users wish to secretly commun-
icate, one of them obtains a secret communication key from AS -nd 
distributes it to the other. If a new key is obtained for each 
interaction, then a user need not keep a list of secret communi-
cation keys for all of his correspondents. 
v 
The key distribution protocol is as follows. Let x denote 
the message x enciphered under key K. For a user A to acquire a 
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key CK to share with another user B, these steps are taken: 
A -> AS: (A, B, Iftl) (1) 
where is an identifier chosen by A and used only once. Since 
is returned by the server, enciphered wi th A's secret key, A 
can be sure that the response (2) is not a replay of a previous 
response. 
tf A 
AS -> A: (IA1, B, CK, Y) (2) 
where 
Y - (CK, A) K B 
Note that since Y is enciphered with B's secret key, it cannot be i 
deciphered by A. A distributes the message Y containing CK to B: 
A -> B: Y (3) 
At this point A can be sure that the key CK is safe to use, but B 
cannot be sure that the enciphered message Y is not a replay of a 
previous message sent from A. To protect against this problem, a 
handshake between B and A follows: 
B -> A: <IB1) C K (4) 
A -> B: (f(IB1)) * (5) 
where Ig^ is an identifier chossn by B. A returns an agreed 
function f of in order to signal his acceptance of CK. The 
function £ could be something simple like f(I) = 1 - 1 . Needham 
and Schroeder maintain that the complete sequence (1) - (5) will 
establish a secure channel between A and B (assuming neither of 
the private keys KA or KB has befen compromised). 
Analysis of the Handshake 
As described, the handshake is inadequate. We will argue 
first that, if any previous communication keys has been comprom-
ised , the handshake does not provide an acceptable level of secu-
rity. We will argue_second that, if no keys are ever comprom-
ised , the handshake does not prevent message blocking. 
First we suppose that a previous communication key CK' used 
by A and B has been compromised. If the intruder also intercept-
ed the previous message Y* sent from A to B (step 3) as well as 
the previous handshake (steps 4 and 5), then he can impersonate A 
unless the function f used in the handshake is. a non-trivial 
secret function known only to A and B. In particular, the in-
truder can replay the message Y' to B, and then apply the same 
function f used in the previous handshake to impersonate A in the 
next handshake. If the same function f is used by all users, 
then the intruder need only have intercepted the message Y' (he 
needs at least Y* since he does not know B 1s secret key KB). 
After successfully tricking B into accepting the known key CK1, 
the intruder can decipher any messages transmitted from B to A. 
Now, the problem of securing secret handshake functions is 
as difficult as the problem of secur i ng commun ication keys. 
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Users must either privately exchange and remember permanent 
handshake functions, or they must obtain them from the authenti-
cation server. If the former approach is taken, then users may 
as well exchange directly their communication keys and dispense 
with the handshake functions. If the latter approach is taken, 
the problem of distributing handshake functions is identical to 
theproblem of distributing keys. 
Next, suppose that keys are never compromised. In this case 
the handshake does guard against replay: an intruder who has in-
tercepted a previous exchange (1) - (5) between A and B of a key 
CK* will be unable to impersonate A and trick B into using CK'. 
However, consider the motives of the intruder attempting to trick 
B into using CK'. Since he will be unable to decipher any mes-
sages enciphered under "CKr, his motive must be either simply to 
block the communication path from B to A, or to block the path 
and trick B into accepting previous (replayed) messag es from A. 
Blocking the communication path from B to A could be achieved in 
many other ways (e.g., by interjecting noise onto the channel); 
successful completion of a handshake does not guarantee that sub-
sequent transmissions are not blocked. If B wishes to be sure 
that messages sent to A are not blocked, then he should sdd se-
quence numbers and time-stamps to his messages and request a re-
ply from A to each message. If messages and replies have se-
quence numbers and time-stamps, this will also prevent the in-
truder from tricking B into accepting previous messages from A. 
The use of time-stamps to protect against message replay was also 
noted by Needham and Schroeder and by Kent (KENT783 . 
Solution 
We believe that any key distribution system should be based 
on the premise that communication keys may be compromised, and 
that recovery from compromise .must be possible. Operating from 
this premise, secure distribution of secret communication keys on 
a computer network requires more than a handshake. We propose a 
simple solution which eliminates' steps (4) and (5) of the distri-
bution protocol, but adds a time-stamp T to steps (2) and (3). 
The couplets protocol is thus: 
A -> AS: (A, B) (1) 
KR KA AS -> A: (B, CK,- T, (A, T, CK) ) (2) 
A -> B: (A, T, CK) K B (3) 
A and B can verify that their messages are not replays by check-
ing that: 
I Clock - T| < Atl + At2 
where Clock gives the local time, Atl is a n interval representing 
the normal discrepancy between the server's clock and the local 
clock, and At2 is an interval representing the expected network 
delay time. If each node sets its clock manually by reference to 
a standard source, such as the N3S broadcast time on WWV, Atl on 
the order of one or two minutes would suffice. As long as Atl + 
£$.2 i s less than the interval since the last use of the protocol, 
this method of time-stamping will protect against replays. Since 
the time-stamp T is enciphered under the secret keys KA and KB, 
impersonation of AS is not possible. 
Needham and Schroeder rejected the use of time-stamps in 
their key distribution protocol on the grounds that there might 
not be a network-wide reliable source of time. As we have ar-
gued, time-stamps can be used reliably even if the settings of 
local clocks are not completely "reliable. 
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